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Abstract: We study a posted-salary labor market in which firms engage in salary
competition. Firms’ preferences over workers are private information, creating
uncertainty about competitive pressure for different workers. We consider a
baseline 2-firm, 2-worker model, then extend the analysis to larger markets by
replicating the baseline. We characterize the unique Bayesian- Nash equili-
brium, in which each firm type chooses a distributional strategy with interval
support in the salary space. The main result shows that competition is localized,
in the sense that firm types with a common most preferred worker choose non-
overlapping, adjacent supports. We also provide numerical results to show that
the equilibrium strategies in finite replicated markets converge to the corre-
sponding equilibrium strategies in a market with a continuum of firms and
workers.
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1 Introduction
In many labor markets, firms compete with each other for workers along several
dimensions. These include salary, employee benefits, bonuses, health insurance
coverage, and opportunities for career advancement. In most cases, firms and
workers bargain over these terms of employment during the hiring process. But in
some situations, firms pre-commit to the salary or compensation package to be
offered for a particular job opening. It is not unusual for a firm to set policies
regarding benefits, bonuses, health plans, or vacation time, rather than persona-
lize the terms of employment for each individual employee. The terms of employ-
ment may be inflexibile due to firm-wide policies, or contractual arrangements, or
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because the salary for the position has been widely advertized. Or perhaps a
department within an organization must negotiate, in advance, with a board of
directors or a department manager, over the precise compensation package to be
offered for the position. Thus, there are interesting labor market environments in
which firms cannot tailor the various terms of employment to the particular
worker who they hire.
In this article, we analyze the competitive behavior of firms in one such
environment. We consider a posted-salary labor market in which the firms
possess private information about their own preferences. The market consists
of a set of firms, each with one available position, and a set of workers, each
searching for one position. Each firm in the market posts a fixed salary and
commits to pay the posted salary to whichever worker is eventually hired.
Moreover, the firms’ preferences over the set of workers are private information,
so that each firm faces uncertainty about the level of demand (among their
competitors) for their more preferred candidates.
The combination of private information with the firms’ commitments to
posted salaries creates a novel, albeit specific environment. In particular,
when the firms are unable to renegotiate with each candidate, the possibility
of Pareto inefficient matchings emerges as a concern. For example, if a firm
makes a high salary offer that is rejected by their first preference, any subse-
quent offer to a less preferred candidate must be made at the same high salary,
which may preclude otherwise profitable arrangements. Alternatively, if a firm
makes a lower salary offer to their second choice, then discovers that their first
choice would have accepted a marginally higher salary offer, they cannot renege
and recontract even when it would be profitable to do so.
The timing of events for the environment studied in this article are as
follows. Before firms and workers are matched, the firms choose salaries pri-
vately and simultaneously. The matching process is modeled using the firm-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, developed by Gale and Shapley
(1962). Thus, the process begins with each firm extending an offer at their posted
salary to at most one worker, and each worker then tentatively accepts at most
one offer and rejects all others. Any firm whose offer is rejected can then extend
the same salary offer to another worker, after which the workers again decide
which (if any) offer to tentatively accept. The process continues until no new
offers are made, at which time all tentatively accepted offers are confirmed. In
addition, there are two important rules that apply to the matching process. First,
firms cannot revisit workers who have previously rejected their offer. Second,
firms cannot retract an offer that has been tentatively accepted.
A well-known result from the matching literature is that the firm-proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm gives each firm a dominant strategy to make
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offers in a straightforward manner. For the matching procedure described above,
this means that firms have a dominant strategy to make offers in order of
preference, but only to workers who are acceptable to the firm at its chosen
posted salary. Furthermore, since all workers care only about salary, there is a
unique stable matching for any profile of firm preferences and salary offers. As a
result, no worker has an incentive to strategically reject an offer. Thus, without
any incentives for strategic sequencing of offers (by firms) or strategic rejection
of offers (by workers), the focus in this article is on the strategic salary decisions
made by the firms in the presence of private information.
The article first analyzes a two-firm, two-worker model, in which the firms
can be one of four (preference) types. The first result proves that, in the two-firm,
two-worker model, there are no pure strategy equilibria. However, there does
exist a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in mixed (distributional) strategies
which are continuous with interval support. The second and third results derive
the characterization of this unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Proposition 2
establishes that the equilibrium exhibits a separation of types, in the sense that
between two types who have a common most preferred worker, one type mixes
over salary offers that are everywhere higher than the salaries chosen by the
other type. The type that offers a lower equilibrium support ‘concedes defeat’ in
the event that the other firm is the type offering higher salaries. Instead, those
firms concentrate on competing in the event that their competitor is of their own
type. Similarly, each firm of the type offering the higher salaries pays a premium
just high enough to always outbid the other type, then concentrates on compet-
ing against their own type by mixing over an interval of salaries. In this respect,
competition is localized to firms with ‘similar’ types. The full characterization
result is provided in Proposition 3, where we show that the relative marginal
value attached to the workers by different types determines which type makes
the higher offers in equilibrium.
In the second part of the article, we extend the analysis to larger markets by
replicating the two-firm, two-worker model. In the limit, when there are a con-
tinuum of firms and a continuum of workers, there is no aggregate uncertainty
about the realization of types. Thus, competition in equilibrium is confined to the
most popular worker class. The third main result is a characterization of the
equilibrium in the limit case. We then prove the existence of a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in continuous distributional strategies with interval support for each
finite replicated market. The proof, which is by construction, establishes that the
separation result obtained in Proposition 2 also applies to types with a common
most preferred worker class in finite replicated markets.
Finally, we provide numerical results to show that the finite market equili-
brium strategies converge to the corresponding continuum equilibrium
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strategies as the number of replications approaches infinity. Thus, as the repli-
cated markets get larger, the uncertainty over competitive pressure disappears,
and competitive behavior is only sustained for the most popular worker class.
1.1 Related Literature
A similar environment with posted salaries has been studied by Burdett and
Mortensen (1998). They consider a game where a continuum of firms choose
permanent wage offers and a continuum of workers search by sequentially
sampling from the set of offers. Workers search both while unemployed and
while employed for a job with an acceptable, or higher wage, respectively. The
principal result in Burdett and Mortensen (1998) is that wage dispersion is a
robust outcome when workers must search for individual offers, provided that
workers search while employed as well as when unemployed. They characterize
the unique equilibrium (steady state) distribution of wage offers under different
assumptions about firm and worker heterogeneity.
Our approach in this article differs in several important respects from the
setup used in Burdett and Mortensen (1998). First, workers are not identical in our
model. Offers are posted and then directed by firms to particular workers, rather
than posted for workers to search for and accept as they please. In particular, this
allows for a firm to exclude workers who are not acceptable to them at their
posted salary. Second, we assume that firms have only unit demands. That is,
each firm wants to be matched with just one worker, rather than to build up a
team of workers.
The most important implication of these differences is that, in our model,
each worker faces a potentially different distribution of offers. Firms have
different ordinal preferences and may control which workers are allowed to
accept their offer. In terms of our results, we also find that the equilibrium
salary distributions offered by different firm types exhibit wage dispersion (both
within and among the types). However, the wage dispersion is driven by private
information among the firms and the competitive pressure among heteroge-
neous firms for heterogeneous workers. This is distinct from the wage dispersion
derived in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), which is driven in part by the multi-
unit demands of the firms, and in part by their heterogeneous productivities
with respect to a set of perfectly substitutable workers.
This article is also related to several others that study salary competition in
two-sided markets, although almost all of them investigate markets with com-
plete information. In particular, Bulow and Levin (2006), Niederle (2007), and
Kojima (2007) study the effects of a centralized matching mechnism on salaries
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relative to the competitive equilibrium.1 Bulow and Levin (2006) provide a
theoretical result which suggests that worker salaries are compressed and
depressed relative to the competitive equilibrium, by the centralized matching
algorithm used in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP).
The first treatment of matching with salaries is Shapley and Shubik (1972),
which modifies Gale and Shapley (1962) to incorporate a transferrable utility
good in which salaries can be paid. The early literature on matching with
transferable utility was further developed by Crawford and Knoer (1981) and
subsequently, by Kelso and Crawford (1982), who devised a salary adjustment
process which converges to a core allocation.2 More recently, Hatfield and
Milgrom (2005) develop a model of matching with contracts that incorporates
the Kelso and Crawford (1982) model.3 They show that if the preferences of the
firms satisfy a gross substitutes condition and a law of aggregate demand condi-
tion, then truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker-
proposing matching mechanism.
While matching with salaries has attracted considerable interest in recent
years, the existing literature omits a study of the environment in which firms’
preference orderings over workers are private information. The study that comes
closest to doing so is by Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009), who introduce a
model of assortative matching in which there is incomplete information on both
sides of the market. However, the incomplete information in their setting relates
to attributes of potential partners, rather than preference orderings of potential
competitors. Both workers and firms can send signals regarding their own
attributes. However, once a worker has chosen a signal in their model, every
firm has the same ranking over workers, based on their signals. Likewise, once a
firm has chosen a signal, every worker has the same ranking over firms.
In contrast, the objective of this study is to understand the effects of private
information about the preference orderings of potential competitors on salary
competition. The baseline model is most similar to the Bulow and Levin (2006)
setup. However, it extends their approach by allowing firms to have different
primitive preferences over workers. This assumption then allows for firms’
1 Another paper that investigates the importance of various assumptions in the Bulow and
Levin (2006) model is Gonzalez-Diaz and Siegel (Forthcoming), who focus on a set of job
features, including salaries, reputation, responsibility, work hours, training, and quality of
facilities, that may affect a hospital’s attractiveness to workers in a non-linear manner.
2 A core allocation in this context is a one-to-one matching along with a salary schedule, in
which no firm and no worker can negotiate a salary at which they would prefer each other over
their current partners at their current salaries.
3 Other related work includes Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009), Crawford (2008),
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preferences to be private information, which is the main innovation to the
existing literature on matching with salaries.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and the matching process, then introduces the general two-firm, two-worker
game with private information. In Section 3, we prove that there are no pure
strategy equilibria, then provide an example which demonstrates the main
features of the equilibrium in distributional strategies. Section 3 also establishes
the separation result, and provides the full characterization for the symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in continuous distributional strategies with interval
support. In Section 4, the model is extended to larger markets. We characterize
the equilibria of the limit case in which there are a continuum of firms and
workers, then prove existence (and the separation result) for finite replicated
markets. Finally, Section 5 presents the numerical results, which show that the
equilibrium strategies in finite replicated markets converge to the corresponding
continuum equilibrium strategies as the number of replications approaches
infinity. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Two-Firm, Two-Worker Model
Suppose there are two firms f1, f2 2 F and two workers w1,w2 2 W . Each firm has
strict preferences over the set fw1,w2, ;g, where ; represents being unmatched.
It is safe to ignore any preference ranking in which remaining single is the most
preferred option, since a firm with those preferences will exit the market. Thus,
there are four possible preference rankings for each firm.
Pa : w1 w2 ; Pb : w1 ; w2
Pc : w2 w1 ; Pd : w2 ; w1.
Assume that each preference ranking is represented by a pair of values, one for
each worker, while the value of remaining unmatched is 0. This assumption is
somewhat restrictive, since it means that two firms with same preference rank-
ing also have the same values for the workers. In Section 6, I discuss ways to
relax this assumption about the type space.
Refer to a firm with preferences Pk as a firm of type k. Then the set of firm
types is described as p f = fa, b, c,dg where, for example, a = ða1, a2Þ and aj is the
value of worker j to type a for each j= 1, 2. In order to represent the preference
rankings, the values of the different types must satisfy the following conditions.
a1 > a2 > 0 b1 > 0 > b2
c2 > c1 > 0 d2 > 0 > d1.
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Definition 1: A worker w is acceptable to firm f if f prefers w to remaining
unmatched.
The second definition modifies the standard notion of an acceptable worker to
account for the preferences of the firms at a given salary level.
Definition 2: Given any salary, xf, chosen by firm f, a worker w is salary-
acceptable to firm f if f’s value for worker w is greater than xf.
The values corresponding to each type are common knowledge, however, each
firm knows only its own type. The types are drawn independently according to a
common prior distribution π over p f = fa, b, c, dg. Given the two disjoint sets of
agents, define a matching as follows.
Definition 3: A matching is a function μ : F ∪W ! F ∪W ∪ f;g such that
(1) μðf Þ 2 W ∪ f;g for all f 2 F,
(2) μðwÞ 2 F ∪ f;g for all w 2 W, and
(3) μðμðiÞÞ= i for all i 2 F ∪W with μðiÞ≠ f;g.
Letm denote the set of all matchings.
For any firm f with type k = ðk1, k2Þ, the utility derived from a matching μ 2m is
given by
ufkðμÞ=
k1 if μðf Þ=w1
k2 if μðf Þ=w2
0 if μðf Þ= f;g
8><
>: .
Before the matching is determined, the firms each choose a salary. Then the
following steps determine the matching outcome.
Step 1. Each firm makes an offer to (at most) one worker;
Step 2. Each worker tentatively accepts at most one offer, and rejects all others;
Step 3. Any firm whose offer was rejected may make the same salary offer to the
other worker (who has not already rejected them);
Step 4. Each worker tentatively accepts at most one offer out of the one (if any) it
tentatively holds, and the new offers received at Step 3, and rejects all others.
Step 5. Since there can be no new offers after Step 4, the procedure terminates
and all tentative matches are confirmed.
In principle, both the firms and workers could adopt many different strategies.
However, as the following two remarks make clear, it is not necessary to
consider anything more than the simplest strategies.
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Remark 1: For any set of chosen salaries, each firm has a dominant strategy to
make offers in order of preference to salary-acceptable workers only.
Once firms have chosen salaries, the matching procedure described by Steps 1 to
5 is equivalent to the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm for a
specific matching market in which the firms’ “preferences” are their original
preferences, restricted to their (respective) sets of salary-acceptable workers, and
workers’ preferences are given by ranking the firms according to salary, from
highest to lowest. It follows from Theorem 5 in Roth (1982), that firms have a
dominant strategy to make offers in order of preferences, but restricted to salary-
acceptable workers.
Remark 2: For any profile of firm preferences and any set of chosen salaries, each
worker has a dominant strategy to reject all but the highest salary offered to them.
Recall that the firm-proposing DA mechanism is stable. That is, for any profile of
reported preferences, it produces a matching that is stable with respect to the
reported preferences. Since all the workers have the same preferences, there is a
unique stable matching for each realization of firm preferences and set of chosen
salaries. By Theorem 4.16 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), every set of worker
strategies that form a Nash equilibrium with the truthful strategies of the firms
produces a matching that is stable with respect to the true preferences. Then
since each induced market has a unique stable matching, and the matching
mechanism is stable, there is no other Nash equilibrium strategy that dominates
truth-telling by the workers, for any realization of firm types and posted salaries.
Since there are no incentives for strategic sequencing of offers by the firms, or
for strategic rejection by theworkers, the rest of the paper focuses on the behavior of
the firms when they decide upon a salary. In fact, it is useful to describe the
outcomes from the matching process by a direct revelation outcome function g.
Let g:p ×R 2+ !m be an outcome function thatmaps the preferences (types) of the
two firms and the salaries chosen by the firms into the set of matchings. Firms have
a dominant strategy to announce their true preferences over salary-acceptable
workers and the workers simply reject all but the highest offer made to them.
3 Equilibria in the Two-Firm, Two-Worker Model
The game is formally defined by Γ= ðF, W, p, R + , π, g, fufkgf , kÞ, which consists
of the sets of firms F = ff1, f2g, and workers W = fw1,w2g, the firm type space p,
the space of possible salaries R + , and the type distribution π. The outcome
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function g represents the matching process described by Steps 1–5, and fufkgf , k are
the utility functions for each firm and each firm type over the set of matchings.
3.1 Pure Strategy Equilibria
A pure strategy for a firm f is a function sf : p f ! R + which selects a salary for
each possible firm type. Given a strategy s− f for the other firm, firm f ’s expected
payoff from announcing a salary xf when its type is k is given by
EUfk xf , s− f ,
 
=
X
p2p− f
πðpÞ  ufk g k, p, xf , s− f ðpÞ
  
.
Proposition 1: As long as π has full support, there is no pure strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium to the game, Γ.
Proof: See Appendix. □
The intuition for the proof is that two firms of the same type, who are willing to
accept their second favorite worker, will ‘bid’ each other up to the marginal value
for the preferred worker. But then each has an incentive to give up on the
preferred worker and maximize their payoff by hiring the second worker at a
salary of 0. Once one firm does this, the other again has an incentive to offer
slightly more than 0 for the preferred worker and the bidding war will begin again.
3.2 Distributional (Mixed) Strategy Equilibria
Formally, a distributional (or mixed) strategy for firm i is a function
σi: p! ΔðR + Þ which announces, for each preference type, a distribution over
salaries in R + . For simplicity, refer to the symmetric equilibrium ðσ*, σ*Þ by the
equilibrium strategy σ* = ðG*a, G*b, G*c, G*dÞ where G*k is the cumulative distribu-
tion announced by a firm whose type is k. I assume that strategies are contin-
uous distributions with interval support.4 Before turning to the results, it is
useful to work through a simple example for the two-firm, two-worker model.
Example 1: Suppose a= ð2, 1Þ, b= ð2, − 1Þ, c= ð1, 2Þ, and d= ð− 1, 2Þ, while
πðaÞ= 12, πðbÞ= 18, πðcÞ= 14, and πðdÞ= 18.
4 There may be other types of symmetric equilibria, with non-interval support, or discontin-
uous strategies. In addition, there may be asymmetric equilibria.
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Notice that the marginal benefit to getting worker w1 is higher for type b than
type a, and the marginal benefit to getting worker w2 is higher for type d than
type c. Given these parameters, a natural conjecture is that type b firms will
make higher offers than type a firms, and type d firms will make higher offers
than type c firms. Furthermore, given the distribution of types π, worker w1 is ex
ante more popular (or believed to be more popular) than w2. As such, one might
expect to see higher salaries on average being offered to w1.
Indeed, for Example 1, there exists an..equilibrium, which is described as
follows:
G*a = 2x on the support 0,
1
2
 
G*bðxÞ=
7x − 3.5
2− x
on the support
1
2
,
11
16
 
G*cðxÞ= 4x on the support 0,
1
4
 
G*dðxÞ=
7x − 1.75
2− x
on the support
1
4
,
15
32
 
.
This equilibrium exhibits several interesting features. First, there is no over-
lap between the equilibrium supports of types with a common most preferred
worker. Since the marginal value of getting worker w1 is less for type a than for
type b, firms of type b always announce higher salaries than firms of type a. In
other words, firms of type a are resigned to getting their second favorite worker
(w2) when the other firm is type b. Instead, a type a firm focuses just on
competing against another type a firm. On the other hand, a type b firm offers
enough to ensure that it outbids any type a firm, then focuses on competing
against the chance that the other firm is a type b. This type of ‘separation result
between types a and b is also exhibited by types c and d, and as will be shown
below, is a characteristic of any equilibrium in continuous distributional strate-
gies with interval support.
Second, equilibrium salaries are higher on average for firms of type a than
type c and for type b than type d, even though they have comparable values for
their respective preferences. This reflects the relative popularity of worker w1
over worker w2. This notion of popularity is manifested in the differences in the
probabilities of facing another firm with the same most preferred worker. For
types a and b, the probability of facing another type a or b is 58, while for types c
and d, the probability of facing another type c or d is only 38. As a result, the
average salaries offered in equilibrium are higher for type a than type c, and
higher for type b than type d.
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3.3 The Characterization
Consider the general two-firm, two-worker model. The salary strategies chosen
by types that share a common most preferred worker together determine the
matching for firms of those two types. On the other hand, salaries do not affect
the matching output when the realized types do not have a common most
preferred worker. Thus, pairs of types with common most preferred workers
can be considered in isolation from one another. Without loss of generality,
consider types a and b. The following two lemmas allow us to characterize the
supports for the equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 1: Between types with a common most preferred worker, the lowest salary
offered in equilibrium must be 0.
Proof: See Appendix. □
Lemma 2: In equilibrium, there are no gaps between the equilibrium supports for
types with a common most preferred worker.
Proof: See Appendix. □
These two lemmas imply that equilibria must be consistent with one of four
cases. In each case, type a mixes over ½xa, xa, and type b mixes over ½xb, xb,
where
Case 1. 0 = xa < xb ≤ xa < xb
Case 2. 0 = xb < xa ≤ xb < xa
Case 3. ½xa, xa  ½xb, xb, and xb =0
Case 4. ½xb, xb  ½xa, xa, and xa =0.
Proposition 2 generalizes and formalizes the separation result illustrated in
Example 1, by showing that there cannot be equilibria of the form described
by Case 3 or Case 4.
Proposition 2: (The Separation Result). Equilibrium supports do not overlap for
types with a common most preferred worker. In particular then, any equilibrium
must be of the form in Case 1 with xb = xa or Case 2 with xa = xb.
Proof: See Appendix. □
The proof for Proposition 2 is based on demonstrating that indifference cannot
be satisfied simultaneously for both types on an interval with non-empty
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interior. As a result, the equilibrium supports in Case 1 and Case 2 must meet at
their boundaries. For Case 3 and Case 4, the same argument implies that a
support which is a subset of the other must be a single point. Since best
responses in pure strategies have already been ruled out, there must not exist
an equilibrium in which one support is nested in the other.
The next proposition characterizes all symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria in
which strategies are continuous with interval support. Moreover, it provides the
set of conditions that determine, for each pair of types with a common most
preferred worker, whether their equilibrium supports are consistent with Case 1
or Case 2. The condition depends on the relative marginal benefits of getting the
types’ common most preferred worker, and on the probability that a firm is the
type that also finds the other worker acceptable.
Proposition 3: (The Characterization). Consider the two-firm, two-worker model.
(i) If b1 > πðaÞða1 − a2Þ, then in equilibrium,
G*aðxÞ=
x
πðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ
on the support 0, πðaÞða1 − a2Þ½ 
G*bðxÞ=
1− πðbÞ
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ x − πðaÞða1 − a2Þ½ 
on the support πðaÞða1 − a2Þ, πðbÞb1 + ð1− πðbÞÞπðaÞða1 − a2Þ½ ,
regardless of G*c, G
*
d. The analogous result holds for types c and d if
d2 > πðcÞðc2 − c1Þ.
(ii) if b1 < πðaÞða1 − a2Þ, then in equilibrium,
G*bðxÞ=
xðπðcÞ+ πðdÞÞ
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ
on the support 0,
πðbÞb1
1− πðaÞ
 
G*aðxÞ=
ð1− πðaÞÞx − πðbÞb1
πðaÞð1− πðaÞÞða1 − a2Þ
on the support
πðbÞb1
1− πðaÞ ,
πðbÞb1
1− πðaÞ + πðaÞða1 − a2Þ
 
.
The analogous result holds for types c and d if d2 < πðcÞðc2 − a1Þ.
Proof: See Appendix. □
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Part of the condition in Proposition 3 has a simple intuition. If type b gets a
higher value from worker w1 than the marginal value for type a from getting w1
instead of w2, then type b will be willing to pay more than type a for w1. The role
of πðaÞ in the condition is less obvious. Keeping the values fixed, if πðaÞ is
relatively low, a type a firm does not need to mix over a large interval to
compete against its own type. As a result, if type a firms offer salaries above
those offered by type b, there may be an incentive for type b firms to offer
salaries higher than the type a firms in order to ‘steal’ worker w1 in the event that
the other firm is type a. Any such deviation by type b firms would give type a
firms an incentive to lower the support of their distributional strategies to the
lower bound of 0.
Proposition 3 also leads to two corollaries. First, all things being equal, the
more likely a firm is to face another firm of the same type, the stronger the
competitive pressure and the higher the average equilibrium salary offered by
that type. Similarly, the more likely a firm is to face another firm with the same
most preferred worker, the stronger the competition and the higher the average
equilibrium salary offered by the two relevant types. Proofs for both corollaries
are provided in the appendix.
Corollary 1: The higher the probability a firm type has to compete against its own
type, the higher (on average) the equilibrium salary offered by that firm type.
Corollary 2: For any firm, the higher the probability that the other firm has the
same most preferred worker, the higher the equilibrium salary (on average) offered
by the firm.
4 Competition in Large Markets
This section extends the analysis of competitive behavior to larger markets. A
general extension, in which the number of distinct workers and therefore the
number of firm types grows larger, poses some problems. As the number of
workers grows larger, the firm type space grows exponentially, which greatly
complicates the equilibrium analysis. Thus, to keep the analysis tractable, we
replicate the two-firm, two-worker market. This generates a market with 2n firms
and 2n workers, consisting of n identical class W1 workers and n identical class
W2 workers. We characterize the equilibria for the limit case in which there are a
continuum of firms and a continuum of workers, then prove existence, for finite
replicated markets, of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in continuous distributional
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strategies with interval supports. Moreover, both Proposition 2 and Proposition 3
generalize to replicated markets. Finally, we provide numerical results to show
that as the number of replications grows to infinity, the finite market equilibrium
strategies converge to the corresponding continuum equilibrium strategies.
4.1 Market Replication
Replication provides a convenient way to conduct a tractable analysis of com-
petitive behavior in large markets. We use, as a baseline, the two-firm, two-
worker market, with F1 = f1, f2f g and W = w1,w2f g. In an n-replicated market,
there are 2n firms, Fn = f1, . . . , f2nf g, along with n copies of
w1,Wn1 = w
1
1,w
2
1, . . . ,w
n
1
 	
, and n copies of w2,Wn2 = w
1
2, . . . ,w
n
2
 	
. Since wj1 and
wk1 are identical copies of one another, we assume that all firms are indifferent
between any two workers in Wn1 . Likewise, all firms are indifferent between any
two workers in Wn2 . As a result, firms’ preferences (and from these, their types)
are defined as strict orderings over the set W1,W2, ;f g where W1 and W2 are two
classes of perfectly substitutable workers.
As in Section 2, firm types that prefer being unmatched over every worker
are ignored.5 This leaves four possible firm types that are essentially the same as
the types in the two-firm, two-worker model, except that the preferences are over
classes of workers W1 andW2.
Pa : W1 W2 ; Pb : W1 ; W2
Pc : W2 W1 ; Pd : W2 ; W1.
Assume that each preference ranking is represented by a pair of values - one for
each worker class, W1 and W2 – while the value of remaining unmatched is
normalized to 0. So, for each type k 2 fa, b, c, dg, k = ðk1, k2Þ, where ki is the
value of each worker w in the class Wi. For the values to represent the corre-
sponding preference rankings, they must satisfy
a1 > a2 > 0 b1 > 0 > b2
c2 > c1 > 0 d2 > 0 > d1.
Each firm knows only its own type, and the types are drawn independently
according to the common prior distribution π over fa, b, c, dg. That is, πðkÞ is the
probability that a given firm is a type k firm, or equivalently, has preferences Pk.
5 We may just as well assume that they don’t enter the market in the first place.
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4.2 Equilibria in the Continuum Case
Before analyzing the equilibria for a finite replicated market, consider the equili-
brium behavior in the limit, when there is a continuum of firms, and continuum
of workers. Moreover, suppose that the measure of workers in each class W1 and
W2 is half the total measure of W. In this environment, since there are infinitely
many firms, the aggregate uncertainty about the realized firm types disappears
from the market. That is, πðkÞ is the actual proportion, or the measure of type k
firms in the market. This is a convenient feature because it makes the equilibrium
strategies relatively straightforward functions of the distribution π.
As for the two-firm, two-worker case, the equilibrium strategy for a given
type k does not depend on the strategies of the two types k′, k′′ that have a
different most preferred worker class than type k. Thus, as in Section 2, when
deriving equilibrium strategies, types a and b can be treated independently from
types c and d. Without loss of generality, consider types a and b. The analysis is
symmetric for types c and d. Proposition 4 characterizes the equilibria for the
limit case. It is broken into two cases based on the relative marginal values of
worker class W1 compared with worker class W2, for types a and b.
Proposition 4: The following two cases, (1) and (2), characterize the equilibrium
when there are a continuum of firms and a continuum of workers, with two equally
large worker classes.
(1) Suppose b1 ≥ a1 − a2.
(i) If πðaÞ + πðbÞ ≤ 12, then x*a =0 and x*b =0.
(ii) If πðaÞ > 12, then x*b = a1 − a2 and
x*a =
0 with probability pað0Þ = 2ðπðaÞ+ πðbÞÞ− 12πðaÞ
a1 − a2 with probability 1− pað0Þ
(
.
(iii) If πðbÞ > 12, then x*a =0 and x*b = b1.
(iv) If πðaÞ ≤ 12, πðbÞ ≤ 12, but πðaÞ + πðbÞ > 12, then x*b = a1 − a2 and
x*a =
0 with probability pað0Þ = 2ðπðaÞ+ πðbÞÞ− 12πðaÞ
a1 − a2 with probability 1− pað0Þ
(
.
(2) Suppose b1 < a1 − a2
(i) If πðaÞ+ πðbÞ ≤ 12, then x*a =0 and x*b =0.
(ii) If πðaÞ > 12, then x*b 2 ½0, b1 and
x*a =
0 with probability qað0Þ= 2πðaÞ− 12πðaÞ
a1 − a2 with probability 1− qað0Þ
(
.
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(iii) If πðbÞ > 12, then x*a = b1 and x*b = b1.
(iv) If πðaÞ ≤ 12, πðbÞ ≤ 12, but πðaÞ+ πðbÞ > 12, then x*a = b1 and x*b = b1.
The formal proof is omitted. Instead, the intuition can be explained with
reference to Figure 1(a) and 1(b), which provide graphical illustrations of the two
cases in Proposition 4. Each figure plots πðaÞ against πðbÞ and divides the space
of probability pairs ðπðbÞ, πðaÞÞ into segments for each subcase of the equili-
brium characterization. In both Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b), the bottom left
triangle corresponds to the case in which there is an excess supply of class W1
workers, and therefore no competition between types a and b. In this case, both
types can choose a salary equal to zero and be assured of matching with a
worker from W1. Thus, x*a = x
*
b =0 for both cases when πðaÞ+ πðbÞ ≤ 12.
Figure 1(a) merges the subcase in which πðaÞ > 12 with the subcase in which
πðaÞ ≤ 12 and πðbÞ ≤ 12, but πðaÞ+ πðbÞ > 12, since in each, type a firms mix between
0 and a1 − a2 with probability pað0Þ= 2½πðaÞ+ πðbÞ− 12πðaÞ , while type b firms choose
a1 − a2. In each of these subcases, the competitive pressure among Finally, in
the case when πðbÞ > 12, type b firms compete with each other and push the salary
up to their marginal value from a class W1 worker, while type a firms know that
they will not be matched with a class W1 worker and so choose a salary of 0.
In Figure 1(b), we can likewise merge the subcase in which πðbÞ > 12 with the
subcase in which πðaÞ ≤ 12 and πðbÞ ≤ 12, but πðaÞ+ πðbÞ > 12, since in each subcase,
(a) Case (1): b1 ≥ a1 − a2 (b) Case (2): b1 < a1 − a2
Figure 1: Continuum Equilibria for Firm Types a and b in Cases (1) and (2) from Proposition 4.
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both type a firms and type b firms choose a salary of b1. When πðaÞ > 12, type a
firms mix between 0 and a1 − a2 with probability qað0Þ= 2πðaÞ− 12πðaÞ , while type b
firms choose a salary in the interval [0, b1]. This is because type a firms drive the
salary for a class W1 worker up to a1 − a2 > b1, so that type b firms are never
matched with anyone. Since some of the type a firms will miss out on a class W1
worker, they mix between the salary a1 − a2 and 0.
4.3 Finite Replicated Markets
As in both the two-firm, two-worker and the continuum cases, we prove exis-
tence of a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in continuous distributional stra-
tegies on interval support, for given parameters of the model. The full
characterization must be solved for implicitly using the indifference equations
derived in the proof, which is given in the Appendix. Most importantly, we find
that the separation result obtained in Proposition 2 extends to the equilibrium
for any finite replicated market, with respect to firm types with a common most
preferred worker class.
Proposition 5: Given any finite replicated market with 2n firms, n workers in class
W1 and n workers in class W2, there exists an equilibrium ðG*aðÞ, G*bðÞ, G*cðÞ, G*dðÞÞ
such that G*kðÞ is a continuous distribution with interval support in the salary space,
for all k = a, b, c,d. The equilibrium supports for types a and b satisfy
0= xa < xa = xb < xb
or 0= xb < xb = xa < xa.
The analogous result holds for the equilibrium supports of types c and d.
Proof: See Appendix. □
5 Convergence of Finite Market Equilibria
This section shows numerically that the replicated market equilibrium strategies
converge to the corresponding continuum equilibrium as the number of replications
goes to infinity. The convergence is illustratedby simulating replicatedmarkets for the
market presented in Example 1. Recall that a= ð2, 1Þ, b= ð2, − 1Þ, c= ð1, 2Þ, and
d= ð− 1, 2Þ, while πðaÞ = 12, πðbÞ= 18 , πðcÞ= 14, and πðdÞ= 18. The corresponding con-
tinuum equilibrium is as follows,
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x*a =
0 with probability 14
1 with probability 34
(
x*b = 1, x
*
c =0, x
*
d =0.
The equilibrium distribution for a type a firm in an n-replicated market satisfies
xa =0
xa = a1 − a2ð Þ
Xn− 1
j= 0
X2n− 1− j
k = n+ 1− j
ð2n− 1Þ!πðbÞjπðaÞk½1− πðbÞ− πðaÞ2n− 1− j− k
j!k!ð2n− 1− j− kÞ!
" #
and for all x 2 xa, xa½ 
x = a1 − a2ð Þ
Xn− 1
j=0
X2n− 1− j
k = n+ 1− j
ð2n− 1Þ!πðbÞjπðaÞk½1− πðaÞ− πðbÞ2n− 1− j− k
j!k!ð2n− 1− j− kÞ!
"
×
Xn− j− 1
t =0
k
t
 !
G*aðxÞk − t½1−G*aðtÞ
t
#
.
The last equation can be solved, given any value of G*aðxÞ, for the corresponding
value of x. Then the pairs ðx,G*aðxÞÞ that satisfy the indifference equations for a
given value of n can be used to trace out the equilibrium distribution for a type a
firm in a market that has been replicated n times. Figure 2 plots these pairs
ðx,G*aðxÞÞ with x on the horizontal axis and G*aðxÞ on the vertical axis for several
different values of n.
Figure 2: Replicated Market Equilibria for Example 1. Type a firms’ equilibrium strategies for
n 2 f2, 3, 6, 10, 20, 60, 100, 200, 250g.
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For smaller sized markets, n 2 f2, 3, 6, 10, 20g, increasing the market size
shifts more density to higher salaries and expands the equilibrium support.
However, after n grows large enough (for example, by n= 60), the equilibrium
support approaches its upper bound of 1 (the marginal value for a class W1
worker, a1 − a2). Then for any larger replicated markets, type a firms shift greater
weight towards salaries very close to the upper bound. In order to maintain
indifference over the support, they must also shift density to the very low
salaries (close to 0), which leads to a sequence of CDFs that approaches the
continuum equilibrium as n approaches infinity.
The same procedure can be run for type b firms, and also for types c and d.
For type b firms, the corresponding equilibrium support has a lower bound equal
to the upper bound of the support for type a firms, by the separation result. The
size of the support for a type b firm’s equilibrium strategy is decreasing with the
size of the market, since the probability of having to compete with n other type b
firms goes to zero. Then, since the lower bound for sufficiently large n is equal to
1, the equilibrium strategies converge towards the continuum equilibrium strat-
egy, which places the entire mass on a salary equal to 1. Figure 3 shows the
simulated calculations for equilibrium strategies of a type b firm in different sized
markets. Of particular interest is the observation that by n= 6. there is already
almost no competitive pressure for a type b firm to compete against another type b
firm. Even with so few replications, a type b firm realizes that the chances of there
being more than 5 other type b firms (among the other 11 firms) is almost zero. As
a result, type b firms choose a salary just high enough to ensure that they will be
Figure 3: Replicated Market Equilibria for Example 1. Type b firms’ equilibrium strategies for
n 2 f2, 3, 6, 10, 20, 60, 100, 200, 250g.
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ranked higher by the workers than any type a firms. Similarly, as the number of
replications increases, for each type c and type d firm, the probability that there
are n− 1 other type c or type d firms in the market goes to zero, removing any
competitive pressure in their pursuit of a w2 worker. Thus, the equilibrium
strategies converge to the continuum equilibrium strategies, where type c and
type d firms choose a salary of zero. Thus, as the market is replicated, competitive
pressure is enhanced only for the most popular worker class. However, even then,
there is no pressure to compete for the firm type with a higher relative marginal
value for the popular workers.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we study the competitive behavior of firms in a unique labor
market where firms must commit to offer the same salary to any worker they
wish to hire. The firms do not know the preferences of other firms, and so face
an uncertain level of competitive pressure. In equilibrium, we find that competi-
tion is localized, in the sense that the different firm types mix over adjacent, but
non-overlapping salary intervals. The characteristics of competition are robust to
the size of the market, but as it grows, the uncertainty disappears until there is
competition only for the most popular class of workers.
The article presents several key results for both the two-firm, two-worker
model, and for larger, replicated markets. First, we show that, in the two-firm,
two-worker case, there does not exist a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. We then proceed to a characterization of the unique equilibrium in
distributional strategies with interval support. This characterization shows that
strategy supports for types with a common most preferred worker are adjacent,
such that the type with a higher relative marginal value for the preferred worker
pays a premium to ensure it is selected before any firm of the other type.
We extend the analysis to larger markets by replicating the baseline two-
firm, two-worker model. In the limit, when there are a continuum of firms and a
continuum of workers, there is no aggregate uncertainty about the realization of
firm types. As a result, competition in equilibrium is confined to the class of
workers that are more popular, while the salaries of other workers fall to zero.
For finitely replicated markets, we prove the existence of distributional Bayesian
Nash equilibrium strategies that exhibit the same separation result obtained for
the two-firm two-worker case in the equilibrium supports, for types with a
common most preferred worker class. Finally, we report numerical results to
show that, as the number of replications grow, the equilibrium strategies in the
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finite replicated market approach the corresponding continuum equilibrium
strategies. That is, when markets become larger, aggregate uncertainty about
the actual types of other firms dissipates and reduces the level of competitive
pressure on salaries.
A natural extension of this paper is to consider a more general n-firm, n-
worker model. In this article, large markets are generated by replicating the two-
firm, two-worker model, which controls the size of the type space and keeps the
analysis tractable. A limitation of this approach is that all workers in the same
class are treated as identical from the perspective of the firms. Future work
might focus on relaxing this assumption, while maintaining tractability. An
alternative approach may be to relax the restriction that firms with the same
preference ordering must have the same valuation or utility representation for
that ordering. For instance, suppose each firm’s type is a pair of values θ= ðx, yÞ,
each drawn independently from some interval ½θ, θ according to a given
distribution.
Another potential extension is to introduce some correlation structure into
the beliefs about other firms’ types. Since in many cases, firms will be looking
for candidates with similar characteristics, it may be more realistic to relax the
assumption that types are drawn independently from the common prior. Such
an extension will likely increase the degree of perceived competitive pressure for
the more common firm types, leading to higher equilibrium salaries. Finally, we
might also consider allowing for more firms than workers, so as to intensify the
baseline level of competitive pressure for all workers.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider any arbitrary pair of strategies (s1, s2) and
suppose firm 1’s type is a. Notice that, if firm 2’s type is either of c or d, then
regardless of s1(a), firm 1 is matched with worker w1. The case that matters is
when firm 2’s type is a or b, because then the outcome depends on the salaries
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announced by the firms. If firm 2 is playing s2, then firm 1’s best response
is to announce s1ðaÞ= maxfs2ðaÞ, s2ðbÞg+ ε as long as s1ðaÞ ≤ a1 − a2. If
maxfs2ðaÞ, s2ðbÞg ≥ a1 − a2, then firm 1’s best response is to announce s1ðaÞ=0.
However, given the choice of firm 1, s1ðaÞ= maxfs2ðaÞ, s2ðbÞg+ ε, firm 2’s best
response, if it is type a, is to offer s2ðaÞ= s1ðaÞ+ ε, up to s2ðaÞ ≤ a1 − a2. The same
type of incremental best responses exist for type b firms, and by symmetry, also
for types c and d. Since the probability distribution over types has full support
(i. e. no type occurs with zero probability), every type faces some chance of
being drawn into this cycle.
Thus, firms who have a common most preferred worker will continue to
outbid each other until the marginal benefit of ‘winning’ the worker is equal to
the marginal benefit of not winning (either 0 or the marginal benefit of the other
worker). However, once that point is reached, the best response is to announce a
salary of 0, and the bidding-up process will begin all over again. □
Proof of Lemma 1: Let ½xa, xa and ½xb, xb be the equilibrium supports for types
a and b respectively. Suppose by means of contradiction that neither xa, nor xb,
is equal to 0. Consider 0 < xa ≤ xb. Type a’s expected payoff from is x = xa
EUaðxaÞ= ½πðaÞ + πðbÞa2 + ½πðcÞ+ πðdÞa1 − xa
and for any x 2 ½0, xaÞ, type a’s expected payoff is
EUaðxÞ= ½πðaÞ+ πðbÞa2 + ½πðcÞ+ πðdÞa1 − x <EUaðxaÞ.
This means that ½xa, xa cannot be an equilibrium support unless xa =0 or
0 ≤ xb < xa.
If 0 < xb ≤ xa, type b’s expected payoff from x = xb is
EUbðxbÞ= ðb1 − xbÞ½πðcÞ + πðdÞ.
That is, at the lower bound of type b’s equilibrium support, a firm of type b does not
get matched to a worker unless the other firm is type c or type d. But in those cases,
the salary does not affect the outcome, so that choosing a salary of xb > 0 is strictly
dominated by x =0. Thus, ½xb, xb cannot be an equilibrium support unless xb =0 or
0 ≤ xa < xb. Therefore, in equilibrium, we must have either xa =0 or xb =0. □
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose xa < xb. Then∀x 2 ðxa, xbÞ, type b’s expected payoff is
EUbðxÞ= ðb1 − xÞ ð1− πðbÞÞ
> ðb1 − xbÞ ð1− πðbÞÞ=EUbðxbÞ,
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contradicting the inclusion of xb in the equilibrium support for type b. The proof
is similar for the case when xb < xa. Since the supports are intervals by assump-
tion, there are no other cases to be considered. □
Proof of Proposition 2:
Case 1: 0= xa < xb ≤ xa < xb
Consider the interval ½xb, xa on which both firm types a and b make offers.
Suppose by means of contradiction that this interval has a nonempty interior.
For type a, the expected payoff for any salary in the interval is
EUaðxÞ = ða1 = a2Þ πðaÞG*aðxÞ+ πðbÞG*bðxÞ
 
− ða1 − a2Þ πðaÞ+ πðbÞ½ + a1 − x
for all x 2 ½xb, xa. To make type a indifferent on the interval, we must have
g*aðxÞ=
1
πðaÞ ða1 − a2Þ −
πðbÞ
πðaÞ g
*
bðxÞ, ∀x 2 xb, xa½ . [1]
Integrating eq. [1] with respect to x yields
G*aðxÞ =G*aðxbÞ +
x − xb
πðaÞ ða1 − a2Þ −
πðbÞ
πðaÞG
*
bðxÞ, [2]
for all x 2 ½xb, xa.
On the other hand, type b has expected payoff
EUb xð Þ= b1 − xð Þ π að ÞG*a xð Þ+ π bð ÞG*b xð Þ+ π cð Þ+ π dð Þ
 
, ∀x 2 xb, xa½ .
For type b to be indifferent on the interval, we need
g*bðxÞ−
G*bðxÞ
b1 − x
=
πðcÞ+ πðdÞ+ πðaÞG*aðxÞ
πðbÞ ðb1 − xÞ −
πðaÞ
πðbÞ g
*
aðxÞ.
Solving this differential equation and using integration by parts, we find
G*bðxÞ =
ηðxÞ− ηðxbÞ
πðbÞ ðb1 − xÞ , ∀x 2 ½xb, xa, [3]
where ηðsÞ= sðπðcÞ+ πðdÞÞ− πðaÞG*aðsÞðb1 − sÞ. Then, by substituting eq. [3] into
eq. [2] and simplifying, we must have
G*aðxbÞ=
1
πðaÞ
b1 − x
a1 − a2
− πðcÞ− πðdÞ
 
[4]
for every x 2 ½xb, xa. Since πðaÞ > 0 and a1 > a2, the right hand side of eq. [4] is
strictly decreasing in x, which implies that the interior of the interval ½xb, xa
must be empty. That is, xb = xa.
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Case 2: 0= xb < xa ≤ xb < xa
Consider the interval ½xa, xb, on which both type a and type b make offers.
Suppose again by contradiction that this interval has a nonempty interior. For
type b, the expected payoff for any salary in the interval is
ðb1 − xÞ πðaÞG*aðxÞ+ πðbÞG*bðxÞ+ πðcÞ+ πðdÞ
 
.
To make type b indifferent on the interval, we must have
g*bðxÞ−
G*bðxÞ
b1 − x
=
πðcÞ + πðdÞ+ πðaÞG*aðxÞ
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ −
πðaÞ
πðbÞ g
*
aðxÞ. [5]
Solving the differential eq. [5] and using integration by parts to simplify the
solution, we have
G*bðxÞ=
ðx − xaÞ ðπðcÞ+ πðdÞÞ
πðbÞ ðb1 − xÞ −
πðaÞ
πðbÞG
*
aðxÞ+
k
b1 − x
, ∀x 2 ½xa, xb, [6]
where k is some constant of integration. Using the fact that G*b xbð Þ= 1 we can
solve for
k = b1 − xb +
πðaÞ
πðbÞG
*
aðxbÞ ðb1 − xbÞ −
πðcÞ+ πðdÞ
πðbÞ ðxb − xaÞ. [7]
Substituting eq. [7] into eq. [6] and simplifying gives
G*bðxÞ=
b1 − xb
πðbÞ ðb1 − xÞ πðbÞ+ πðaÞG
*
aðxbÞ
 
−
πðaÞ
πðbÞG
*
aðxÞ−
πðcÞ+ πðdÞ
πðbÞ ðb1 − xÞ ð
xb − xÞ.
[8]
For type a, the expected payoff for any salary in the interval is
EUaðxÞ= ða1 − a2Þ πðaÞG*aðxÞ+ πðbÞG*bðxÞ
 
− ða1 − a2Þ πðaÞ+ πðbÞ½ + a1 − x,
for all x 2 xa, xb½ . Solving to make type a indifferent and using the fact that
G*a xað Þ =0 by assumption, we have
G*aðxÞ=
x − xa
πðaÞða1 − a2Þ −
πðbÞ
πðaÞ G
*
bðxÞ−G*bðxaÞ
 
. [9]
Substituting eq. [8] into eq. [9] and simplifying yields
x − xa
a1 − a2
+
½πðcÞ+ πðdÞðxb − xÞ
b1 − x
−
b1 − xb
b1 − x
ðπðbÞ+ πðaÞG*aðxbÞ [10]
=
½πðcÞ+ πðdÞðxb − xaÞ
b1 − xa
−
b1 − xb
b1 − xa
ðπðbÞ+ πðaÞG*aðxbÞÞ [11]
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for all x 2 xa, xb½  Notice that the right hand side of eq. [10] is constant. To
maintain equality, the derivative of the left hand side with respect to x must be 0
for every x 2 xa, xb½ . However, this derivative,
1
a1 − a2
−
b1 − xb
ðb1 − xÞ2
ðπðcÞ + πðdÞ− πðbÞ− πðaÞG*aðxbÞÞ, [12]
changes with x unless or b1 − xb =0 or πðcÞ+ πðdÞ= πðaÞG*aðxbÞ+ πðbÞ. Furthermore,
in those cases, the eq. [12] equals 1a1 − a2 > 0 since a1 > a2. It follows then that the
interior of xa, xb½  must be empty; that is, xa = xb.
Case 3: 0= xb ≤ xa < xa ≤ xb
Consider the interval xa, xa½ , on which xa, xb½ both types make offers. As above,
we can solve for
G*bðxÞ=
πðcÞ+ πðdÞ
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ ðx − xaÞ −
πðaÞ
πðbÞG
*
bðxÞ, [13]
for all x 2 xa, xa½ , and
G*aðxÞ=
x − xa
πðaÞða1 − a2Þ −
πðbÞ
πðaÞ G
*
bðxÞ−G*bðxaÞ
 
, [14]
for all x 2 xa, xa½ . In order to satisfy both eqs [13] and [14], we substitute the
latter into the former and simplify, to obtain
G*bðxaÞ =
πðcÞ+ πðdÞ
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ −
1
b1ða1 − a2Þ
 
ðx − xaÞ. [15]
The left hand side of eq. [15] is a constant. To maintain the equality, we must
have the derivative of the right hand side equal to 0 for every x 2 xa, xa½  which
means
πðcÞ+ πðdÞ
πðbÞ b1 − xð Þ −
1
b1 a1 − a2ð Þ
 
=
πðcÞ+ πðdÞ
πðbÞ b1 − xð Þ2
x − xað Þ [16]
However, eq. [16] has a unique solution, which implies that xa = xa. Since we
have already ruled out pure strategies as best responses, it follows that there are
no equilibria of the form described by Case 3.
Case 4: 0= xa ≤ xb < xb ≤ xa
The steps to prove that Case 4 cannot occur are analogous to the steps for
Case 3. We conclude that in order to simultaneously satisfy the conditions for
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indifference by both types on the interval xb, xb½ , we must have xb = xb, which
we know cannot be true, since we have already ruled out pure strategies. Thus,
there are no equilibria of the form described by Case 4. □
Proof of Proposition 3: By Proposition 2, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the
supports for the strategies of two types with a common most preferred worker
(say, a and b) must satisfy either Case 1 with xa = xb, or Case 2 with xb = xa.
Case 1:
Consider Case 1 and suppose that G*aðÞ and G*bðÞ are the candidate equilibrium
strategies for types a and b. For each salary x in the interval 0, xa½ , type a firms
have an expected payoff equal to
EUaðxÞ= a1πðaÞG*aðxÞ+ a2πðaÞ 1−G*aðxÞ
 
+ a2πðbÞ+ a1 πðcÞ+ πðdÞ½ − x.
Since the firm needs to be indifferent between any salary that is offered as part
of its equilibrium strategy, we must have
g*aðxÞ=
1
πðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ∀x 2 0ð , xa. [17]
Integrating with respect to x yields
G*aðxÞ=G*að0Þ+
ðx
0
1
πðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ ds [18]
=G*að0Þ+
x
πðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ , ([19]
for all x 2 ½0, xa. We assume that when both firms choose a salary of 0, the
workers flip a coin if they have to decide between the two offers. As a result, the
payoff from x =0 is strictly less than from some small ε > 0. Thus, G*að0Þ=0. Then
we have
G*aðxÞ=
x
πðaÞða1 − a2Þ ∀x 2 ½0, xa, [20]
and since G*aðxaÞ= 1, we can solve for xa = πðaÞða1 − a2Þ.
Similarly, for each salary x in the interval ½xa, xb, type b firms have an
expected payoff equal to
EUbðxÞ= ðb1 − xÞ½πðbÞG*bðxÞ+ 1− πðbÞ. [21]
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In order for type b firms to be indifferent between all the salaries in the interval
½xa, xb, we must have
g*bðxÞ−
G*bðxÞ
b1 − x
=
1− πðbÞ
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ , ∀x 2 ðxa, xb [22]
Solving the differential eq. [22] gives
G*bðxÞ=
1− πðbÞ
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ ðx −
xaÞ+ cb1 − x , ∀x 2 ½xa, xb. [23]
G*bðxbÞ= 1 allows us to solve for
c= b1 − xb −
1− πðbÞ
πðbÞ ðxb − xaÞ,
and substitue into eq. [23], which simplifies then to
G*bðxÞ= 1−
xb − x
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ , ∀x 2 ½xa, xb. [24]
Having solved for xa = π að Þ a1 − a2ð Þ, we use the fact that G*b xað Þ to solve for
xb = πðbÞb1 + ð1− πðbÞÞπðaÞða1 − a2Þ. [25]
Substituting eq. [25] into eq. [24] and simplifying gives the equilibrium strategy
for type b firms,
G*bðxÞ=
1− πðbÞ
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ ½x − πðaÞða1 − a2Þ
on the support πðaÞða1 − a2Þ, πðbÞb1 + ð1− πðbÞÞπðaÞða1 − a2Þ½ 
The condition that b1 > πðaÞða1 − a2Þ follows immediately, since if
b1 < πðaÞða1 − a2Þ, then πðaÞða1 − a2Þ, πðbÞb1 + ð1− πðbÞÞπðaÞða1 − a2Þ½  is not an
interval; the upper bound is less than the lower bound. This takes care of Case 1.
Case 2:
Now consider Case 2. For each salary x in the interval ½0, xb, type b firms have
an expected payoff equal to
EUbðxÞ = ðb1 − xÞ½πðbÞG*bðxÞ + πðcÞ+ πðdÞ. [26]
In order for type b firms to be indifferent between all the salaries in the interval
½0, xb, we must have
g*bðxÞ−
G*bðxÞ
b1 − x
=
πðcÞ+ πðdÞ
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ , ∀x 2 ð0, xb. [27]
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Solving the differential eq. [27] gives
G*bðxÞ=
πðcÞ+ πðdÞ
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ x +
c
b1 − x
, ∀x 2 ð0, xb. [28]
For the same reasons as above, we can easily verify that G*bð0Þ=0, which
implies c=0, and therefore
G*bðxÞ =
πðcÞ+ πðdÞ
πðbÞðb1 − xÞ x ∀x 2 ½0, xb. [29]
Since G*bðxbÞ= 1, we can solve for xb = πðbÞb11− πðaÞ.
For a type a firm, the expected payoff for each salary x 2 ½xb, xa is given by
EUaðxÞ= a1πðaÞG*aðxÞ+ a2πðaÞð1−G*aðxÞÞ+ a1ð1− πðaÞÞ− x. [30]
For firm type a to be indifferent on the interval, we must have
g*aðxÞ=
1
πðaÞða1 − a2Þ , ∀x 2 ½xb, xa. [31]
Integrating and using the fact that G*aðxbÞ=0, we obtain
G*aðxÞ=
x − xb
πðaÞða1 − a2Þ , [32]
for all x 2 xb, xa½ . Then substituting xb = πðbÞb11− πðaÞ into eq. [32] and simplifying gives
the equilibrium strategy for type a firms,
G*aðxÞ=
ð1− πðaÞÞx − πðbÞb1
πðaÞð1− πðaÞÞ a1 − a2ð Þ [33]
on the support
πðbÞb1
1− πðaÞ , xa
 
. [34]
Finally, using G*aðxaÞ = 1 allows us to solve for xa = πðbÞb11− πðaÞ+ πðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ. This
takes care of Case 2. The proof for types c and d is identical, except for the
notation. □
Proof of Corollary 1: In Case 1, the expected salary offer of firm type a is just the
expected value of a uniform random variable on 0, πðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ½  – that is,
E xað Þ= πðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ2 ,
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which is strictly increasing in πðaÞ. For type b, the expected salary is
E xbð Þ=
ðπðbÞb1 + ð1− πðbÞÞπðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ
πðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ
x  g*bðxÞdx. [35]
Recall that the distribution
G*bðxÞ=
1− πðbÞ
πðbÞ b1 − xð Þ x − πðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ½ ,
which gives
g*bðxÞ=
1− πðbÞ
πðbÞ
b1 − πðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ
b1 − xð Þ2
 !
. [36]
Since b1 > π að Þ a1 − a2ð Þ for this case, we have b1 > x, and g*bðxÞ is increasing in x.
Furthermore,
∂g*bðxÞ
∂πðbÞ = −
b1 − πðaÞ a1 − a2ð Þ
πðbÞ b1 − xð Þ½ 2
< 0 [37]
implies that g*b xð Þ decreases as πðbÞ increases. However,
∂2g*bðxÞ
∂πðbÞ2 is also negative,
which means that the decrease in g*b xð Þ from an increase in πðbÞ is more severe
for lower values of x.
Since the upper bound of the integration is increasing in πðbÞ, the expected
value of the salary offered by type b must be increasing with πðbÞ, since we
assign positive weight to higher salaries not previously included, and the weight
attached to those salaries that were previously included falls more for lower
salaries than higher salaries.
The proof for Case 2 uses a similar series of calculations to verify that the
expected salary is increasing in the probability of the firm type. It should also be
mentioned that, for some values of b1 and a1 − a2, as πðaÞ is increasing, it may
cause the equilibrium to switch from Case 1 to Case 2. In this case, there is some
chance that the average equilibrium salary will jump down (or up), however, for
any further increases in the result will continue to hold. □
Proof of Corollary 2: First, we show that the average equilibrium salary for a
given firm type is non-decreasing in the probability of the other firm type with
the same most preferred worker. Together with Corollary 1, this implies the
result. For Case 1, type a’s expected salary does not depend on πðbÞ. On the
other hand, for type b, both the lower and upper bounds of the support increase
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with πðaÞ. Futhermore, g*bðxÞ is decreasing in πðaÞ, but does so more severely for
lower salaries. Therefore, the expected salary for type b increases with πðaÞ.
Again, we follow the same steps for proving the result in Case 2, and show
that in that case, the expected salary for type a is actually increasing in πðbÞ.
Also, as discussed in the proof for Corollary 1, for some values of b1 and a1 − a2,
an increase in πðaÞ may cause the equilibrium to switch from Case 1 to Case 2.
For type b, this means that the expected salary ought to jump down discretely,
lowering the expected salaries of type b for high enough values of πðaÞ.
Nevertheless, within a particular case, the expected salary for type b is increas-
ing in πðaÞ. □
Proof of Proposition 5: Let πðaÞ+ πðbÞ ≥ 12 and suppose b1 ≥ a1 − a2. We conjec-
ture the existence of a pair of equilibrium distributions ðG*aðÞ,G*bðÞÞ, with
supports 0, xa½  and xa, xb½ , respectively. In order to prove that these are in
fact equilibrium strategies, we first need to show indifference between each of
the salaries in their corresponding equilibrium supports.
Consider type a firms. For any type a firm f, the expected utility of a salary
xf 2 0, xað Þ is
EUa xf
 
= a1 − a2ð Þ  Pr μðf Þ 2 W1½ + a2 − xf . [38]
The probability Pr μðf Þ 2 W1½  consists of two terms that capture, respectively,
(1) the probability that the actual number of type a firms and type b firms is
less than or equal to n (the number of classW1 workers), plus
(2) the probability that
– the actual number of type a’s and type b’s is greater than n,
– the number of type b’s is less than n, and
– the number of type a firms that choose x > xf is less than or equal to
n− the number of type b’s.
In any other realization of types and salaries, the firm f is matched with a worker
w 2 W2 and so receives a payoff of a2.
If we let j denote the number of type b firms and k denote the number of type
a firms out of the 2n− 1 other firms, then we can rewrite the first term of
Pr½μðf Þ 2 W1 as
Xn− 1
s= 0
2n− 1
s

 
πðaÞ+ πðbÞ½ s  1− πðaÞ− πðbÞ½ 2n− 1− s,
and rewrite the second term of Pr½μðf Þ 2 W1 as
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Xn− 1
j=0
X2n− 1− j
k = n+ 1− j
ð2n− 1Þ!πðbÞjπðaÞk½1− πðaÞ− πðbÞ2n− 1− j− k
j!k!ð2n− 1− j− kÞ!
"
×
Xn− j− 1
t =0
k
t

 
G*aðxf Þk − t½1−G*aðxf Þ
t
#
.
At the lowest salary in type a’s support, xf =0, the expected payoff is equal to
a2 + ða1 − a2Þ
Xn− 1
s=0
2n− 1
s

 
½πðaÞ+ πðbÞs½1− πðaÞ− πðbÞ2n− 1− s
" #
. [39]
Since the firm must be indifferent between all of the salaries in the support
½0, xa, we can also solve for the value of xa by equating the expected payoffs
from xf =0 and xf = xa. This implies that
xa = ða1 − a2Þ
Xn− 1
j= 0
X2n− 1− j
k = n+ 1− j
2n− 1ð Þ!πðbÞjπðaÞk½1− πðbÞ− πðaÞ2n− 1− j− k
j!k!ð2n− 1− j− kÞ!
" #
. [40]
Moreover, indifference implies that, for all xf 2 ð0, xaÞ, we have
xf = ða1 − a2Þ
Xn− 1
j=0
X2n− 1− j
k = n+ 1− j
2n− 1ð Þ!πðbÞjπðaÞk½1− πðaÞ− πðbÞ2n− 1− j− k
j!k!ð2n− 1− j− kÞ!
"
×
Xn− j− 1
t =0
k
t

 
G*aðxf Þk − t½1−G*aðxf Þ
t
#
.
[41]
The right-hand side of the equation is a continuous function of G*a xf
 
, which
we have assumed is a continuous function of xf. Since the left-hand side is
strictly increasing in xf, it follows that there exists a continuous function G*aðxÞ
that satisfies the equation.
Now consider type b firms. For any type b firm f, the expected utility of a
salary xf 2 xa, xbð Þ is
EUbðxf Þ= ðb1 − xf Þ  Pr½μðf Þ 2 W1. [42]
Since type b firms don’t care about class W2 workers, they are either matched
with a class W1 worker, or remain unmatched. In this case, Pr½μðf Þ 2 W1 con-
sists of two different terms,
(1) the probability that there are no more than n− 1 other type b firms,
(2) the probability that
– there are more than n− 1 other type b firms, but
– the number of type b firms that choose x > xf is less than or equal to
n− 1.
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Again we let j denote the number of type b firms, however now let k denote the
number of type b firms that choose x < xf . Then we can write the first term of
Pr½μðf Þ 2 W1 as
Xn− 1
j=0
2n− 1
j

 
πðbÞj½1− πðbÞ2n− 1− j, [43]
and the second term as
X2n− 1
j= n
2n− 1
j

 
πðbÞj½1− πðbÞ2n− 1− j
Xj
k = j− n+ 1
j
k

 
G*bðxf Þk½1−G*bðxf Þ
j− k
. [44]
Furthermore, the second term is 0 for xf = xa (the lowest salary in type b’s
support), which means that the equilibrium expected payoff for a type b firm
from any x 2 ½xa, xb must be
ðb1 − xaÞ
Xn− 1
j=0
2n− 1
j

 
πðbÞj½1− πðbÞ2n− 1− j
" #
. [45]
At the top of type b’s support, the probability that any number of other type b’s
choose x < xf = xb is 1. Thus, the expected payoff from choosing xf = xb is just
b1 − xb. In order to ensure indifference, we must have
xb = b1 − ðb1 − xaÞ
Xn− 1
j= 0
2n− 1
j

 
πðbÞj½1− πðbÞ2n− 1− j
" #
. [46]
Finally, for all x 2 xa, xbð Þ, G*bðxÞ must satisfy
b1 − xb
b1 − x
=
Xn− 1
j=0
2n− 1
j

 
πðbÞj½1− πðbÞ2n− 1− j
"
+
X2n− 1
j= n
2n− 1
j

 
πðbÞj½1− πðbÞ2n− 1− j
Xj
k = j− n+ 1
j
k

 
G*bðxf Þk½1−G*bðxf Þ
j− k
#
.
[47]
□
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